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CASE NOTES
the call, consented to the action. Similarly, in People v. Malotte,81 it was
held that police officials may listen in if they obtain the consent of one
of the parties to the conversation. This ruling has been stretched to cover
a vast area of wiretapping with the subscriber's permission, whether or
not the subscriber is a party to the conversation. While the Supreme
Court of the United States decided in Rathbun v. United States82 that
listening in on a regular extension line is not wiretapping, the possibility
of such an extension of the Dixon case to allow limited wiretapping in
Illinois by law enforcement officials remains an intriguing subject for
conjecture.
In the final analysis, it is apparent that until Congress resolves the prob-
lem by clarifying legislation, or the United States Supreme Court grants
certiorari to another wiretap case which addresses the question of the rela-
tion of the Schwart, Benanti, Pugach and Mapp cases, the final denounce-
ment of the wiretap drama will necessarily remain an enigma. Until the
strongly implied condemnation of wiretapping expressed in the Benanti
case is less qualified, or the rationale of the Mapp case is extended from
constitutional prohibitions to federal statutes, Dinan points to a tenacious
adherence by New York to its legislation permitting wiretapping by
police officials.
8146 Cal. 2d 59, 292 P. 2d 517 (1956).
82 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
AND ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
In a trial which took place prior to the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Mapp v. Ohio,' defendant was convicted of having violated
the State of New York's gambling laws.2 On appeal, after the Mapp de-
cision, defendant initially raised the issue that the evidence upon which
he was convicted was obtained by an unlawful search and seizure. The
New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction without looking into
the question of the alleged illegality of the search and seizure. In so hold-
ing the Court found that it had no grounds upon which to review as no
objection was taken at the trial to the introduction of the evidence. It
was also stated by the Court that there was no mention in the record of
the circumstances of the alleged illegal search and seizure. Further, the
1 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Mapp case held that evidence obtained as *a result of an
illegal search and seizure must be excluded in State courts as it violates the Due
Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment.
2 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 986, 986b.
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record did not reflect any inquiry by defense counsel into the circum-
stances of the search and seizure. The Court indicated that if there were
such inquiry, or at least some effort in that direction, defendant might
have preserved the question for review.3 In fact, illegality was not even
suggested, as defendant did not merely fail to object, but expressly stated
that he had no objection to the admission of such evidence. 4 People v.
Friola, 11 N.Y. 2d 157, 182 N.E. 2d 100 (1962).
It is a general rule that in order for a party to preserve a question for
review he must make the objection in the trial court.5 Failure to do so is
considered a waiver of any error that might have occurred, thus barring
review." Under these rules, the defense would have to object to the evi-
dence allegedly obtained by an illegal search and seizure, even though the
law at the time of the trial allowed such evidence, however obtained.
Therefore, the defense would be required to make an objection certain to
be overruled, in order to preserve the question for review.
Confronted with a like situation also created by the Mapp case, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Shorey v. State7 affirmed the defen-
dant's conviction. In that case defendant was charged with rape and
burglary. Articles of bloodstained clothing, which were in plain view of
police who were allowed to enter defendant's premises, were seized and
later introduced into evidence. Defendant contended that there was error
in the trial court because evidence was admitted even though it was ob-
tained by an illegal search and seizure. However, there was no objection
to the admission into evidence of the clothing claimed to have been illegal-
ly obtained. Consequently, the Court held that, even assuming the evi-
dence was illegally obtained, there was nothing for the Court to review.
In a similar case, Banks v. State,8 the defendant first contended on appeal
that evidence should not have been admitted as it was the result of an
illegal search and seizure. The Court in affirming the defendant's convic-
tion, held that to review that question there must have been an objection
in the trial court.9
1 This was a reversal of New York's position permitting illegally obtained evidence
to be admitted as set forth in People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
4 This problem would not arise in Illinois because of its decision in People v. Bro-
camp, 307 Ill. 448, 138 N.E. 728 (1923). That case held that evidence illegally obtained
must be excluded.
5 Snyder v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 1009, 121 S.E. 2d 452 (1961); People v. Carring-
ton, 13 111. 2d 602, 150 N.E. 2d 586 (1958); U.S. v. Bender, 218 F. 2d 869 (7th Cir. 1955).
6 Peters v. State, 366 P. 2d 158 (Mont. 1961); People v. Laster, 413 Ill. 224, 108 N.E.
2d 421 (1952).
7 227 Md. 385, 177 A. 2d 245 (1962).
8 228 Md. 130, 179 A. 2d 126 (1962).
9 Accord, Green v. State, 227 Md. 296, 176 A. 2d 228 (1961).
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This general rule requiring an objection at trial to preserve the question
for review has not been universally applied when an unanticipated pro-
cedural change such as the Mapp case develops. California had to decide
these issues even before the Mapp case because of its Supreme Court deci-
sion in People v. Cahan.10 There the Court excluded evidence obtained as
a result of an illegal search and seizure. The courts of California have per-
mitted review, even though there was no objection in the trial court to the
admission of the evidence, if there was some inquiry into the circum-
stances mentioned in the record.1
In the California case of People v. Kitchens,12 defendant was found
guilty of possession of marijuana. Police officers testified that, acting on
certain information, they went to a third party's apartment. There, de-
fendant was searched without his consent and the marijuana was found.
The officers had no idea who the defendant was. Defendant contended
that the evdience used against him was obtained by an illegal search and
seizure, but no objection was made at the trial. The Court held that the
general requirement of an objection to preserve a question for appeal is
not applicable to appeals based on the admission of illegally obtained evi-
dence in cases tried before the Cahan decision. In response to the prosecu-
tion's contention that in the absence of evidence to the contrary it must
be presumed that the search and seizure were lawful, the Court replied:
"There is, however, sufficient evidence in the rcord to support the con-
clusion that the search and seizure at the time of defendant's arrest were
unlawful." u3
Then in People v. Farrara14 the Court affirmed a conviction, holding
that the necessity of objection to evidence allegedly obtained as a result
of an illegal search and seizure was not applicable to pre-Cahan cases.
There was no evidence in the record indicating illegality. The Court said,
therefore, that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed
that the officers lawfully performed their duties.
When the courts of New Jersey decided these issues created by the
Mapp case, the decisions were in accord with the California viewpoint. In
State v. Smith'5 the Court allowed review when, at the trial, defendant
10 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P. 2d 905 (1955).
11 People v. Kitchens, 46 Cal. 2d 260, 294 P. 2d 17 (1956); People v. Farrara, 46 Cal. 2d
265, 294 P. 2d 21 (1956); People v. Citrino, 46 Cal. 2d 284, 294 P. 2d 32 (1956); People v.
Beard, 46 Cal. 2d 278, 294 P. 2d 29 (1956).
12 46 Cal. 2d 260, 294 P. 2d 17 (1956).
1id. at 263, 294 P. 2d at 19.
14 46 Cal. 2d 265, 294 P. 2d 21 (1956).
15 37 N.J. 481, 181 A. 2d 761 (1962). The Court also went into a discussion as to the
degree of retroactivity of the Mapp case.
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explored the circumstances of the search and seizure without objection
by the State. The defense made no objection, however, to the offer of the
articles seized. The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the rules re-
quire that an objection to the admission of evidence be made at the trial,
but since the defense could not anticipate the Mapp case, the issue would
be heard on the basis of the record made below as interpreted by the law
as it existed at the time of the appeal.
Taking into its consideration the problem created by the Mapp deci-
sion, the New York Court of Appeals, in Friola, permits review whether
or not objection was made to evidence introduced in the trial court. The
only reservation is that some inquiry into the circumstances of the search
and seizure be present in the record.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-CHILD SUPPORT
AND COLLEGE EDUCATION
Plaintiff, wife, brought a petition for additional support against her
husband to send their eighteen-year-old daughter to college. The Domes-
tic Relations division of the County Court of Philadelphia rendered an
order directing the husband to pay the daughter's college tuition to the
extent of a fund created by a child's educational endowment policy which
had been issued to the husband, and which he intended to use to send the
daughter to college. The husband appealed stating that the court abused
its discretion in making the order because no evidence was admitted as to
his financial ability and that the intention to send his daughter to college,
coupled with an insurance policy, is not enough to legally oblige him to
carry out this purpose. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed,
holding that if there is an express agreement or if the circumstances war-
rant it, a parent may be held liable for the support of a child attending
college. The court further stated that while the endowment policy is not
an express agreement, its existence coupled with the father's intention to
send the daughter to college are factors which warrant the decree. The
court also held that the presence of the insurance policy showed the hus-
band's ability to pay. Consequently, there was no abuse of discretion.'
Commonwealtb v. Howell, 198 Pa. Super, 391, 181 A. 2d 903 (1962).
1 There is a dissent by three judges who rely on 18 P.S. § 4733 which, after making
initial provisions for issuance of process and service on a defendant, provides that the
court, after a hearing in a summary proceeding, may order a parent to provide a col-
lege education, when a complaint has been made and the parent is of sufficient ability
to pay such sum as said court shall think reasonable and proper for the comfortable
support and maintenance of the said children. The dissent states that the lower court
would not allow evidence as to the inability of the husband to pay for support; thus no
order should be entered.
